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Abstract
Background:  The purpose of this retro-
spective study is to describe the pattern of 
bribe taking in exchange for release from 
torture, during and after the decades-long 
war in Sri Lanka. Methods:  We reviewed 
the charts of 98 refugee claimants from Sri 
Lanka referred to the Canadian Centre for 
Victims of Torture for medical assessments 
prior to their refugee hearings in Toronto 
between 1989 and 2013. We tallied the 
number of incidents in which claimants 
described paying cash or jewelry to end 
torture, and collected other associated data 
such as demographics, organizations of the 
perpetrators, locations, and, if available, 
amounts paid. We included torture perpe-
trated by both governmental and nongovern-
mental militant groups. Collected data was 
coded and evaluated. Findings: We found 
that 78 of the 95 subjects (82.1%) whose 
reported ordeals met the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture/International 
Criminal Court definitions of torture 
described paying to end torture at least once. 
43 subjects paid to end torture more than 
once. Multiple groups (governmental and 
non-governmental) practiced torture and 
extorted money by doing so. A middleman 
was described in 32 percent of the incidents. 
Payment amounts as reported were high 
compared to average Sri Lankan annual 
incomes. The practice of torture and related 
monetary extortion was still reported after 
the end of the war, inclusive of 2013. 
Interpretation: Torture in Sri Lanka is 
unlikely to end while profit motives remain 
unchallenged. As well as health injuries, 
victims of torture and their families suffer 
significant economic injuries while their 
assailants are enriched. The frequent link 
between torture and impunity means 
multiple populations the world over are 
vulnerable to this abuse.
Mercy for money: Torture’s link to 
profit in Sri Lanka, a retrospective 
review
Wendell Block, M.D.,* Jessica Lee M.D.,* Kera Vijayasingham B.A.*
Key points of interest:
•  This paper supplements earlier studies 
on prevalence of bribe payments to end 
torture in Sri Lanka, adding trends 
throughout the war, after the war, 
involving multiple armed organizations, 
and across wide geographic locations.
•  Victims may not genuinely be consid-
ered to be a security risk but are used for 
extortion.
•  Significant economic and social impact 
on families is likely.
•  Torture unlikely to stop until financial 
incentives are removed.
•  High prevalence suggests that perpetra-
tors act in collusion with their superiors 
and benefit from impunity.
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Introduction 
Reports of bribe payments to end torture are 
commonplace, yet the phenomenon is rarely 
given detailed attention. Torture's efficacy as 
a tool to increase security, and the related 
legal and ethical problems, are frequent 
subjects for public discussion. Medical 
accounts generally focus on the physical and 
psychological impacts torture has on affected 
individuals, rather than on torture's profound 
social sequelae.1 The purpose of this 
retrospective study is to illuminate one of 
torture’s socio-economic dimensions within 
a particular context: the link between torture 
and bribe extortion during the 1983-2009 
war in Sri Lanka, and during the war’s 
immediate aftermath (2009-2013). Based on 
the reports of 98 Sri Lankan refugee 
claimants assessed in Canada during that 
time, this study identifies organizations 
whose members gained financially through 
torture, the amounts of cash involved, and 
the frequency with which detainees were 
released because they paid bribes. The 
political/security aims of the perpetrators, as 
reported by the victims as the overt motiva-
tion for their torture, distinguish these 
actions from the criminal form of kidnapping 
for ransom, which in itself is not considered 
torture. 
By reporting descriptions of recurring 
patterns involving torture-ending bribes, it 
can be argued that financial extortion is 
intertwined with torture in Sri Lanka and 
that the profit motive is thus a potent driver 
of the practice of torture. 
Background 
Civil conflicts, and the locations in which 
these conflicts devolve into open violence, 
involve multiple histories, causes and 
consequences. Outsiders such as ourselves 
will inevitably omit or misrepresent what are 
important facts to many. In the following 
paragraphs, we give what is assuredly a very 
limited sketch of the context for this paper. 
Four hundred years of colonial rule led 
to identification and administrative represen-
tation through essentialized ethnic catego-
ries.2, 3 (p3-39, p47-54) After Sri Lanka 
achieved independence from Britain in 1948, 
there was increasing friction between the 
Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority. 
Government legislation and successive new 
constitutions promoted majority aspirations 
but eroded Tamil and other minority rights 
and their traditionally held protections. 
A war for an independent Tamil state in 
the north and east of the island was eventu-
ally led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers). It began 
after years of political frustration and the 
development of several militant Tamil 
groups. Ultimately, open war broke out after 
the 1983 “Black July” riots in which one to 
three thousand Tamil citizens were killed in 
retaliation for the killings of Sinhalese 
soldiers in the north. 
The LTTE developed their own sophisti-
cated army and navy, and also used suicide 
and other bombings to attack their detractors 
and civilians to instill fear throughout the 
country. “Ethnic cleansing” of Sinhalese and 
Muslim people took place in Tamil “home-
lands”. The LTTE also accepted and 
conscripted women as members of their 
fighting ranks, including the elite “Black 
Tigers” who carried out suicide attacks. This 
meant that young Tamil women, as well as 
men, would be suspected of being “terror-
ists”. The LTTE were notorious for con-
scripting children and forcing them into their 
fighting ranks.4 For years the LTTE enforced 
their de facto governance over large regions 
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For its part, the government was brutal in 
its response. The authorities were already 
empowered by emergency regulations, 
originally promulgated in 1971 under the 
Public Security Ordinances Act to facilitate 
suppression of the largely Sinhalese, class-
based Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
uprisings. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA) of 1979, made permanent in 1982, 
had given the authorities further powers to 
arbitrarily detain terrorist suspects and move 
them to undisclosed locations. Millions of 
civilians were displaced by the war’s violence 
and tens of thousands were killed.2 (p278) 
Detention and torture of civilians was 
common, as were disappearances. This did 
not change after Sri Lanka ratified the 
United Nations Convention against Torture 
in 1994. Also of note is that, in March of 
2004, Sri Lanka ratified the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. 
Multiple Tamil paramilitary groups 
worked alongside the military in support of 
the government’s aim to destroy the LTTE, 
and presumably to extend their own power 
and influence. In a major blow to LTTE 
hegemony in eastern Sri Lanka, “Colonel” 
Karuna and his fighters split from the LTTE 
in 2004 to form their own paramilitary group 
in support of the government.5 Government 
intelligence agencies, “home guards” and the 
police were all involved in the conflict. 
Over the years of the war, there were a 
number of poorly observed ceasefires. The 
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 brought the 
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the 
north and east of the island, until heavy 
losses inflicted by the Tigers forced their 
departure in 1990. Another important 
ceasefire was brokered by Norway and signed 
in 2002, but peace-talks failed and open 
conflict resumed in 2006. (6, p243) 
The war between the Sri Lankan govern-
ment and the LTTE was declared officially 
over in May of 2009. A long military cam-
paign had pushed the LTTE out of their 
strongholds and cornered them on the east 
coast, where they were either killed or taken 
into detention. Velupillai Prabakharan, the 
supreme leader of the LTTE, was killed in 
the fighting, along with many other top 
leaders. Thousands of Tamil civilians had 
been coerced by both sides to retreat with the 
LTTE - as many as 40,000 civilians were 
killed in the final conflict and thousands were 
detained in “rehabilitation camps”.7 (p32) In 
spite of the war’s end, military suppression 
and abuses of human rights are ongoing in 
traditionally Tamil regions of the country. 
Detentions and torture continue to be 
reported by Sri Lankans.8
Methodology 
The reviewed charts were those of all 100 Sri 
Lankan refugee claimants assessed by two 
family physicians from 1990 through 
December 2013. 89 of these medical 
examinations were originally conducted by 
Dr. Wendell Block, one of the authors of this 
article. The medical assessments consisted of 
relevant history-taking, careful examination 
of any scars or injuries attributed to torture, 
a detailed description of the physical findings 
in the medicolegal report along with a 
statement as to whether the findings were 
consistent with the given history. The 
claimants had been referred to the Canadian 
Centre for Victims of Torture (CCVT) by 
their immigration lawyers for medical 
documentation prior to their refugee 
hearings, where these medical reports were 
accepted as evidence by government 
immigration adjudicators. 
The charts reviewed for this study 
included the claimant’s legal narrative and 
the medical report. Two claimant files were 
excluded because they did not contain both 
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individual, while reviewing their chart, a 
separate document was created to note their 
demographic data (including ethnicity, 
gender, year of birth, education level, 
occupation, marital status, year assessed by 
physician at CCVT) and the details of each 
reported incident of torture (including year 
of incident, age of individual during incident, 
military group involved, characteristics of 
detention, detention time, mediating group 
(if applicable), location of incident, judiciary 
involvement (if applicable), round-up versus 
individual detention, and related scars). 
Using a predetermined coding system, the 
individual data was transferred onto a 
spreadsheet for grouping of information and 
comparison. In order to assess inter-rater 
reliability, each reviewer randomly selected 
ten of the other’s charts and recollected the 
data. The data recorded the second time was 
consistent with the initial collection. 
In February and March of 2014, the 
keywords “Sri Lanka civil war”, “Sri Lanka 
human rights”, and “Sri Lanka bribery” were 
used in a search of the University of Toronto 
Library’s articles and databases (which 
include medical and interdisciplinary 
databases), looking for writing directly 
linking human rights abuses with bribe 
extortion. We also accessed the resources of 
organizations known to monitor human 
rights issues in Sri Lanka. Information about 
Sri Lankan incomes was readily accessed 
through Sri Lankan government websites. 
Relevant reports included Transparency 
International’s “In Pursuit of ‘Absolute 
Integrity’—Identifying Causes for Police 
Corruption in Sri Lanka”, which addressed 
the issue of ongoing police corruption.9 
“Police Torture Cases: Sri Lanka 1998-
2011”, an Asian Human Rights Commission 
publication, summarized the most serious 
323 out of 1500 reports of torture during 
that time.10 The victims in these cases were 
not refugee claimants. A common theme was 
the police use of torture to gain confessions 
of crimes and/or to extort bribes from 
randomly arrested individuals, usually from 
the poorer classes.
The definition of torture used in this 
article is that of the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture, as well as Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (to include torture perpe-
trated by non-State combatant groups).11, 12 
These are broad definitions, and to form a 
clearer picture of the kinds of torture 
represented by this study’s findings, an initial 
distinction is made between three subtypes: 
subtype (1) “classical” torture, in which the 
victim alleges physical and/or sexual abuse 
while detained at least overnight in a facility 
controlled by the perpetrator’s organization; 
subtype (2) arbitrary detention, in which the 
victim alleges detention in poor conditions, 
without legal access, without knowledge of 
when they might be released, and with full 
knowledge that they could be physically/
sexually assaulted;5 and, subtype (3) the 
victim alleges physical abuse without 
detention (at least not overnight).
Findings
The 98 subjects described 201 distinct 
detentions which included physical torture 
(first subtype). For 121 of these detentions 
(60.2%), a clearly described payment gained 
the person’s release. Incidents in which a 
release was arranged without the explicit 
description of payments of cash or jewelry 
were not counted. There were 20 clear 
descriptions of payments paid to end 
detentions which did not include overt 
physical abuse (second subtype). Payments 
were also made five times to end assaults by 
government authorities or militants outside 
of detention (third subtype). Thus, there 
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Three of the 98 individuals made their 
Canadian refugee claims for reasons 
unrelated to torture. Of the 95 who had been 
tortured, 73 (76.8%) described at least one 
incident in which they paid to end a deten-
tion during which physical torture took 
place. Another five described paying at least 
once to end a detention not involving 
physical abuse, or to end an assault outside 
of detention, in circumstances believed to 
satisfy the UN torture definition. Thus, of 
the 95 individuals with a history of torture, 
78 (82.1%) described paying to end it at 
least once. 43 (55.1%) reported paying to 
end more than one ordeal.
The 146 bribe incidents could be character-
ized in more detail as follows: 
Timing: Two incidents occurred in 1984-
1985. 17 incidents took place in the period 
1987-1990, when the Indian Peace Keeping 
Force (IPKF) was in northern Sri Lanka. 105 
incidents took place from 1991-2002, seven 
during the 2002-2007 ceasefire, and three 
between 2007 and the war’s end in mid-
2009. 12 incidents occurred after the war. 
Table 1: Study Population Characteristics
Characteristic Total (n) = 98
Ethnicity Tamil = 89 (90.8%) 
Sinhalese = 7 (7.1%) 
Muslim = 1 (1%) 
Unspecified = 1 (1%)
Gender Male = 90 (91.8%) 
Female = 8 (8.2%)
Year of birth Before 1930 = 2 (2%) 
1930-1939 = 2 (2%) 
1940-1949 = 2 (2%) 
1950-1959 = 16 (16.3%) 
1960-1969 = 20 (20.4%) 
1970-1979 = 43 (43.8%) 
1980-1989 = 13 (13.3%) 
1990 and after = 0 
Education Primary = 6 (6.1%) 
Secondary = 59 (60.2%) 
Post-secondary = 18 
(18.4%)  
Unknown = 15 (15.3%)
Occupation Fishers, farmers, labourers 
= 44 (44.9%) 
Commercial business  
= 23 (23.5%) 
Professionals = 10 (10.2%) 
Students = 4 (4.1%) 
Unemployed = 2 (2%) 
Unknown = 15 (15.3%)
Marital status Married = 38 (38.8%) 
Single = 24 (24.5%) 
Widowed = 3 (3.1%) 
Unknown = 33 (33.7%)
Time of medical 
assessment in 
Canada*
1989-2001 = 59 (60.2%) 
2002-2005** = 11 (11.2%) 
2006-2009 = 6 (6.1%) 
2010-2013*** = 22 
(22.4%)
* In all cases, a significant amount of time had 
elapsed between the alleged incidents of torture and 
the time of medical examination
** Ceasefire period in Sri Lanka
*** War was officially over
Table 2: Number of incidents* per claimant 
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Offenders: See Table 3.
Bribe mediators: In 47 incidents, a specific 
individual or group was named as a third 
party who arranged the bribe payment 
(family members not included). The 
mediators were described as “brokers” in five 
cases. Lodge owners in Colombo (Sri 
Lanka’s capital) were described as perform-
ing this service in 11 cases. Providers of 
temporary housing to Tamils fleeing the 
conflict zones en route to leaving the 
country, these lodge owners would step in 
with a payment when the police conducted 
Tamil round-ups (round-ups which led to 
detention and torture, generally for a few 
days). Other mediators included Tamil 
paramilitary groups (7 cases), “a Muslim 
man” (6 cases—one of these was “a Muslim 
woman”), and the agents who had been 
hired to get the subject out of Sri Lanka (8 
cases). Other descriptors were “a lawyer”, 
“the Catholic priest”, the “Gram Sevaka” 
(village leader), “someone with connections”, 
and “a friend of my father’s”. In one case a 
bribe was paid directly to a nurse at a 
hospital to enable an escape. One man, who 
in 1996 had been apprehended by the army 
and turned over to the police in Vavuniya, 
gave this description of his broker: he was 
“one of the middleman (sic) who arranged 
for and collected bribes on behalf of the 
army”.
Bribe amounts: A numeric amount was 
recorded in 73 incidents. Jewelry was used in 
five incidents. The bribe amount was not 
recorded for 68 incidents. Table 4 shows the 
lowest, highest and median amounts 
reported per phase of the war. 
Detention times: Time in detention was 
reported as one month or less in 112 of 141 
detentions ended by a bribe (79.4%). The 
longest detention ended by a bribe was 2.5 
years. 
Torture method: Although the aims of this 
study did not include a quantitative cata-
logue of the methods of torture described by 
the subjects, the methods should be men-
tioned. The most common physical torture 
method included blunt beatings with slaps, 
punches, kicks, and blows with implements 
such as batons, sand-filled pipes and rifle 
butts. Other torture methods included sexual 
assault, asphyxiation, suspension, burns, and 
stress positions. Psychological techniques 
included isolation, humiliation, threats 
(including death threats), exposure to the 
torture of others, sleep interruption, and 
verbal abuse. Detainees were confined in 
dirty, cramped quarters without beds, toilets, 
or ready access to water. Food was of poor 
quality and minimal. There was no access to 
legal assistance or communication with the 
Table 3: Military/Militant groups involved in 
incidents* 














*Incident = an incident of paying to end torture/
detention
Paramilitary groups = EPDP, PLOTE, EPRLF and 
Karuna
LTTE = Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
CID = Criminal Investigation Department
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outside, and no sense of how long each 
detention would last.
Location: The incident location was 
provided in 137 cases. See Figure 1. 
Round-ups: In 48 incidents, the reported 
detention began with a group round-up.  
Legal involvement: Access to a lawyer was 
described in one case.
Associated physical scars: Most of the 
study subjects reported being tortured 
multiple times. Of the 78 individuals who had 
paid at least once to end torture, 76 had 
physical scars consistent with at least one 
episode of torture. Documentation of scarring 
and on-going injuries related to torture was 
the predominant reason for referral to the two 
assessing doctors in the first place. 43 of the 
146 bribe incidents resulted in scars still 
apparent at the medical assessment.
Age at time of incident: Most incidents 
(120) occurred when people were age 21 to 
50, but 22 were under the age of 21 (three 
were 15 or younger). The two eldest were 68 
and 71.
Women: Five of the eight women (all Tamil) 
described paying to end torture, one of them 
twice. Two paid with jewelry. 
Sinhalese men: Four of the seven Sinhalese 
men described paying bribes to end torture: 
Table 4: Amounts paid per phase of war, in Sri Lankan Rupees (Rs. 100,000 equals 746 USD 
(June 4, 2015))










no. of bribe 
incidents
Eelam War I 1983-1986 20,000 20,000 20,000 1/2
IPKF presence 1987-1989 15,000 25,000 25,000 5/14
Eelam War II 1990-1994 3,000 300,000 29,000 11/16














100,000 300,000 200,000 2/4
Post War Jul 2009-2013 25,000 2,500,000 225,000 10/12
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three to policemen, and one to army 
personnel. 
Reasons given for torture: In their legal 
narratives and medical histories, the study 
subjects generally related the accusations 
leveled by their torturers. When LTTE were 
the torturers, the reasons for torture included 
refusal to cooperate with them, and suspicion 
of giving information to the army (or IPKF). 
In the majority of cases, those tortured by the 
military, police, or paramilitaries were 
accused of being LTTE members, of 
supporting LTTE, or of having information 
about LTTE. There was an implied assump-
tion that to be Tamil was to be a suspected 
terrorist. “Round-ups” of Tamils occurred in 
the conflict zones after LTTE actions, and 
also in Colombo where Tamils from outside 
the city were suspect. One person was 
accused of supporting the JVP. Paramilitaries 
also used torture to pressure their victims into 
joining them. Demands for money were 
generally not overt at the beginning, though 
one person recorded that the “EPDP 
demanded 2 lakhs [200,000 Rs.] from me, 
otherwise they would turn me over to the 
police . . . I did not have that kind of money. 
The EPDP took me to the Wellawatte police 
station and I was kept there.” After the war’s 
end, Tamil victims continued to be accused of 
being members of, supporting, or trying to 
reorganize LTTE.
No mention of paying bribes to end 
torture: The 17 individuals who did not 
mention any bribe payments to end at least 
one of their episodes of torture were quite 
similar to the study group as a whole. Nine 
of these individuals reported making 
payments to LTTE to avert a threat.
Other extortions: 77 of the 98 people 
described at least one clear incident of 
extortion outside the context of torture - 
generally by LTTE (68 of the 77). These 
extortions were carried out with threats to 
assault, kill, or detain the victims; or to 
conscript their children. 15 people described 
these extortions by Tamil paramilitary 
groups, four by the IPKF, four by the police, 
and eight by the military. The threats were 
not always demands for cash. People were 
also forced to give the products of their work, 
their vehicles and belongings, their labour, 
and even their blood (for transfusions).  
Discussion 
Amnesty International’s “Locked Away—Sri 
Lanka’s Security Detainees” describes 
reports of police and military personnel 
demanding bribes for the release of security 
detainees.13 Freedom from Torture’s 
“Tainted Peace: Torture in Sri Lanka since 
May 2009”, based on the medicolegal 
assessments of 148 people who had been 
tortured by the Sri Lankan authorities 
between May 2009 and September 2013, 
reports that 105 (71%) gained their release 
by paying bribes.14 (p9) In 2014, the Bar 
Human Rights Committee of England and 
Wales, along with the International Truth 
and Justice Project of Sri Lanka, published 
their STOP study entitled “Torture and 
Sexual Violence in Sri Lanka 2009-2014”. 
This study presents the results of structured 
interviews with Sri Lankan torture survivors, 
conducted by nine independent lawyers; in 
38 of the 40 cases, the survivor reported that 
a bribe had been paid to gain their release.15 
The same group’s follow-up study of 20 
Tamils who had been tortured in 2015 
showed that the practice continues: 19 of the 
20 reported that ransoms had been paid to 
gain their release, and the bribe amounts 
were high (bribes ranged from 350,000 to 
1,000,000 Rs.). In “The Rule of Law in 
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nants and Causes of Torture and Other 
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment in Sri Lanka”, 
Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena analyzes the lack 
of protection from torture afforded to Sri 
Lankan citizens, in spite of Sri Lanka’s 
international agreements, domestic legisla-
tion and institutions which in law should 
provide them with such protection.16 
While these studies note frequent bribe 
payments to end torture, the present study 
examines the phenomenon in more detail; 
throughout the war, including ceasefires and 
the post-war period, and across widespread 
geographic locations. The practice was not 
limited to any particular organization, but 
was practiced by government officials and 
non-government militants alike. Although 
most victims were young adults, individuals 
across all ages and in multiple social groups 
were targeted - their chief commonality was 
the accusation that they supported the 
enemy. The high prevalence of release by 
payment suggests that the victims were not 
truly considered to be a high risk to security. 
Further, the high prevalence also suggests 
that the practice could only have taken place 
as a result of the offending authorities/
militants acting in collusion with their 
superiors.
The descriptions of bribe payments 
within the documents did not describe the 
processes by which these transactions were 
initiated or negotiated, aside from the 
mention of mediators. However, even if 
payment initiation was on the side of the 
victim, in a context in which these transac-
tions are common and the discrepancy in 
power between the parties being so great, 
responsibility must lie with the torture 
perpetrators. 
Does the “profit motive” act as a 
primary motive for the apprehension, 
detention and torture of individuals 
conveniently labeled as “terrorists” or 
“enemy supporters”? Economists assume 
that people tend to pursue opportunities to 
better their lot in life, while minimizing 
risk.17 Thus individuals or groups who are 
given the opportunity to profit through 
torture are likely to do so, if on balance the 
benefits outweigh the potential risks. 
Comparing the bribe amounts in Table 4 
with national household incomes (Table 5) 
shows that, in Sri Lanka, the financial 
rewards gained through torture are high. It 
should be noted that the inflation rate in 
Colombo for this time period was 696%, or 
roughly 30% per year (based on the 
Colombo Consumer Price Index (CPPI) as 
reported by the Sri Lanka Central Bank).18 
Inflation rates would likely have been higher 
for regions of the country more directly 
affected by war. Further instructive 
comparators include: a police constable’s 
monthly wage in 2004 was Rs. 9,605 to 
14,225,19 while the 2013 Sri Lankan 
military website advertised monthly gross 
pay for officer cadets as Rs. 26,617.20
At the same time as financial rewards gained 
through torture being high, a review of Sri 
Lanka’s political context reveals that the risks 
to perpetrators are very low. The Prevention 
of Terrorism Act and related security 
measures allow authorities to detain “sus-
Table 5: Sri Lankan Household Incomes19
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pects” without charge, in undisclosed 
locations, and for extended periods of time. 
The state of impunity for government 
agencies, and the paramilitary groups they 
protect, is well documented. According to 
the International Jurists Commission, as of 
2012, there had been only five court 
convictions of authorities charged with 
torture. In one case, the Officer-in-Charge at 
the Polpithigama Police Station was found 
guilty of torturing a seven year old. The 
Kurunegala High Court sentenced the 
accused to two years in prison (the manda-
tory minimum sentence is seven years) and 
ordered the accused to pay the victim Rs. 
25,000.21 (Sri Lanka’s 1994 Convention 
against Torture Act legislates fines should be 
between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 50,000 - an 
amount unchanged during the high inflation 
time period of this study, and another useful 
comparator to bribe amounts reported).22
Sri Lanka is a signatory to the UN 
Convention against Corruption, and has an 
established Commission to Investigate 
Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.23 How-
ever, the Commission is unable to proac-
tively initiate investigations of its own, and 
has been the subject of political interfer-
ence.24 
As for LTTE, they operated in large 
regions for many years without accountabil-
ity and were free to “tax” and extort resourc-
es in any way they chose,4, 25 with the only 
apparently negative consequence being the 
loss of “hearts and minds”. Some subjects in 
the current study reported closing their 
businesses, or reducing their farming/fishing 
production, because positive output simply 
brought higher demands from LTTE. 
In terms of impact on victims, it is 
possible that many would not have been 
apprehended at all without the profit motive. 
Torturers possibly employ harsher methods 
to heighten family fears and thereby increase 
the amounts they can extort. The desperation 
of the victims’ families is apparent in the 
large sums they were willing to pay to gain 
the victims’ release. The large amounts paid 
also suggest that the economic impact of 
paying them would have been severe; a 
family’s ability to pay likely depended on the 
liquidation of assets, loans arranged under 
duress, or the resources of extended family 
networks (including the diaspora). The 
consequences to those unable to pay the 
demanded bribes are not apparent to this 
study.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that 55.1% 
of the study subjects paid bribes more than 
once to end torture. Study subjects paid 
further large amounts to leave the country 
(often describing hired agents, the payment 
of bribes at checkpoints, to police in Colom-
bo, and to passport control), plus the cost of 
transport leading to Canada. These costs are 
over and above the ‘usual’ economic costs of 
torture, which include interrupted or lost 
employment/education, temporary or 
permanent disability, and family/social 
disruption.26 (p40-69) Far-reaching conse-
quences would therefore have to be borne by 
subject’s families with respect to their 
economy, quality of life, and ultimately 
health, in addition to suffering from the 
multiple effects of a protracted war.
On a societal level, it is well known that 
torture and the fear of torture is successful in 
intimidating and silencing opposition.26, 27 
The threat of torture - to oneself or to loved 
ones - changes behavior through fear of pain, 
rape, permanent injury, and disappearance 
or execution. Given this study’s findings, in a 
context where torture routinely brings the 
extortion of large sums of cash, it is likely 
that intimidation through torture also 
functions by instilling a fear of severe 
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Limitations
This study’s data was collected retrospec-
tively, from documents whose primary 
purpose was not an inquiry into bribes. This 
likely resulted in under-reporting of the 
relevant information.
Subjects may have exaggerated their 
reports of injustice to strengthen their 
application for refugee status, as the purpose 
of the medical assessments was to document 
physical and/or psychological torture for the 
claimant’s refugee hearing. This could include 
their reports of the torture they experienced 
as well as their reports of bribe paying. The 
fact that the information was collected at an 
overseas setting eliminated any possibility of 
substantiating their reports through local 
secondary sources. Information identifying 
those refugee claims found “not credible” by 
the Canadian Immigration Review Board was 
not available at the time of the review.  
Although the subjects represent a broad range 
of educational and occupational backgrounds, 
the lack of direct information regarding their 
incomes is a serious limitation.
The findings of this study focus on the 
behavior of low-ranking officials. The 
impunity granted to them and to allied 
paramilitaries must serve the interests of 
those in power. These links are opaque to 
this study’s methodology, but it would be an 
error to assume they do not exist.
Lastly, women are under-represented in 
this study. The female physician whose 
assessments contributed to this study was no 
longer available after 2001, and the male 
physician generally assessed male refugee 
claimants. It is particularly unfortunate that 
there are no female subjects to represent the 
final years of the war and its aftermath.
Conclusions
1)  In a context where torture turns a profit, 
it is very unlikely that torture will be 
stopped until the financial incentives are 
removed. 
2)  Human rights organizations working 
with torture survivors should routinely 
collect specific data about bribe extortion 
(amount paid, to whom, impact). United 
Nations rapporteurs to the UN Commis-
sion for Human Rights should be 
required to investigate and report the use 
of torture to extract bribes. The States 
responsible should be held to account. 
The United Nations’ 2015 Investigation 
on Sri Lanka, conducted by the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights regarding possible war crimes, 
does report bribe payments as a frequent 
means to release for “surrendees” held in 
detention (and often tortured) at the 
war’s end.28 However, three earlier 
relevant UN Human Rights Commission 
reports reviewed are silent on this 
subject.5, 8, 29 Neither the Sri Lankan 
government’s ‘Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation’, nor the UN Human 
Rights Commissioner’s formal response, 
address this abuse.30  
3)  In Torture and Impunity, Alfred McCoy 
argues that torture leads to empowerment 
of the torturer in terms of social author-
ity.31 (p114-150)  Goodhand et al., based 
on research done in war-affected Sri 
Lankan communities, describe shifts of 
social capital in the context of violence.32 
Our study shows that torture also leads to 
financial empowerment of the torturer, 
and to economic weakening of the 
targeted individual/group. Post-conflict 
efforts to achieve civil reconciliation must 
address the particular ways in which 
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4)  The excesses revealed in this study provide 
another illustration of what happens when 
individuals/institutions have license to 
exert unlimited power over other human 
beings. Impunity and lack of accountabil-
ity should not be seen as unique to Sri 
Lanka, and something which ‘developed’ 
countries eschew to ensure “ethical 
torture.”; impunity generally accompanies 
government authorizations to use “coer-
cive techniques”, exemplified by the U.S. 
Administration making enormous efforts 
to ensure impunity for CIA and military 
personnel engaged in torture after 9/11.31 
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